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1. INTRODUCTION
This essay explores a number of conceptual issues germane to
the analysis of conflict and cooperation in international economic
policy and law. It focuses on issues involving conflict and
cooperation that are vital to international trade theory, particular-
ly departures from the free trade optimum that is the centerpiece
of the theory of comparative advantage and the gains from trade.
This essay also considers situations stemming from departures
from full employment and external balance, both concepts which
figure importantly in international macroeconomic theory. The
conclusion comments on the use of the Michigan Model of World
Production and Trade in providing quantitative analysis of
potentially conflicting and cooperative international economic
actions and policies. While this essay is written from an interna-
tional economic perspective, hopefully it is informative to interna-
tional legal analysts and policy makers as well.
2. CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN THE ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT AND
COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
2.1. The Theory of Comparative Advantage and the Gains from
Trade
The simplest version of the theory of comparative advantage
and the gains from trade - the central focus of international trade
theory - assumes the existence of two industries located in each
of two countries existing in isolation (autarky), with perfect
competition in all markets for goods and factors of production.'
Professor of Economics and Public Policy, University of Michigan.
'See JAMES C. INGRAM & ROBERT M. DUNN, JR., INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS 25-72 (3d ed. 1993) (explaining the theory of comparative
advantage and the gains from trade).
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The theory assumes the productivity of factors (e.g., labor and
capital) employed in each country's industry to be different for
unspecified technological reasons, resulting in different relative
prices of the two goods 'Under such conditions of autarky. This
difference in autarky prices gives rise to the possibility of
international specialization and mutually beneficial trade. Thus,
each country engaged in trade specializes in the production and
export of the good in which it has the greatest comparative
advantage, or least comparative disadvantage, compared to the
other country. Each country subsequently shifts factors of
production towards the country's export industry and away from
what will become its import-competing industry. The theory
relies on perfect mobility of factors of production between
industries within each country, but not between countries.
The assumption of perfect competition guarantees optimum
use of factors of production since firms cannot control the price
at which they sell their output, and thus will maximize their
profits by producing up to the point where the marginal cost of
production equals the given market price. The theory assumes
that individual consumers have given preferences and act rational-
ly in making consumption decisions with respect to both market
prices imposed by manufacturers and budget constraints imposed
by their incomes. As mentioned, factors of production move
without friction between industries as firms expand or contract.
Given the presumption of no barriers of entry and exit for firms
and the domestic movement of factors, the primary role of
government is to foster competition and maintain the social order.
This "ideal" state of affairs emerges as firms and consumers pursue
their self-interest. It is as if an "invisible hand" guides the process.
The concept and ideal of free trade has remained at the core
of international trade theory for over two centuries. What is
interesting for our present purposes is that unfettered international
specialization and exchange maximizes welfare, and thus eliminates
the issue of economic conflict. This should not be taken to mean,
however, that international trade theory ends at this point.
Rather, a great deal of attention has been devoted in the past half-
century to the theoretical analysis of departures from the free-trade
optimum? International economic conflict figures importantly
2 For a synthesis of literature dealing with departures from the free trade
optimum ant the design of policies to correct such departures, see Jagdish N.
Bhagwati, The Generalized Theory of Distortions and Welfare, in TRADE,
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in several cases involving nations' efforts to engage in exploitative
behavior improving their own welfare at the expense of other
nations' welfare. Let us consider the issues involved in analyzing
various departures from the free-trade optimum.
2.2. Departures from the Free Trade Optimum
2.2.1. National Monopoly Power and the Optimum
Tarif
The idealized assumptions of the classic argument for free
trade imply the optimality of free trade only for the world as a
whole. For individual countries, the optimality of free trade
requires the additional assumption that the country is too small
to have any influence, through its policies, over its trading prices.
Without this assumption, free trade is not optimal from a national
perspective. There exists instead an optimal degree of government
intervention in trade, known as the optimal tariff, that works by
turning the country's terms of trade in its favor.
One might think that this argument requires that the country
in question be a large, industrialized country such as the United
States. The size of the country as a whole does not carry as much
significance, however, as the country's share of world trade in its
export and import markets. Since many countries tend to
specialize their exports in a fairly small range of goods - as the
theory of comparative advantage predicts they should - even
small countries may have enough market power over their export
prices for the optimal tariff argument to apply.'
The optimal tariff argument involves a benefit for the
intervening country only at the expense of the country's trading
partners. Indeed, since free trade is optimal for the world as a
whole, it must be true that the rest of the world loses more than
the tariff-levying country gains. A country attempting to take
advantage of its monopoly power in trade creates a situation of
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND GROWTH: PAPERS IN INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER 69 (fagdish N.
Bhagwati et al. eds., 1971).
1 An example would be the oil producing and exporting countries which,
through the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), have
sought to raise oil prices.
4 That is, with an optimal tariff in place, world economic welfare must be
lower as compared to free trade.
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conflict with its major trading partners. The possibility of
retaliation thus looms large in this setting, making it likely that
all countries will lose if they simultaneously pursue this kind of
policy. This suggests the presence of complicated and perhaps
unsolvable strategic issues arising when one or more countries
exercise national monopoly power in foreign trade. The more
that governments realize the potentially damaging effects of
optimal tariff intervention and retaliation, the more likely they
might avoid taking such measures in the first place. Unfortunate-
ly, this does not mean that national governments will always
recognize the potential losses from their actions, in which case the
world will be made worse off.
2.2.2. "Second-Best" Arguments for Government
Intervention
A crucial assumption underlying the classic gains-from-trade
proposition is that all aspects of the domestic economy function
properly, including: perfectly competitive domestic markets,
freely-adjusting prices and wages, and the coinciding of private and
social costs and benefits, which prevents positive and negative
externalities or spillovers arising in production or consumption.
If any of the foregoing conditions fail to hold, a "domestic
distortion" exists, no longer assuring the first-best optimal results
of free trade. Government intervention may therefore be
necessary to correct domestic distortions and restore the first-best
optimum.
Government intervention in trade, however, may not be the
best policy to use when there are domestic distortions. Suppose,
for example, that firms produce insufficient amounts of a good
that confers a positive external benefit on society. An import
tariff could be used to encourage domestic production, but this
distorts consumer choice and reduces welfare because of the higher
domestic price involved. In this circumstance, a production
subsidy would be the best policy to use since it leads firms to
increase their output of a good conferring positive social benefit
while leaving consumers free to consume at undistorted market
prices. The optimal, or first-best, policy is the one addressing the
original distortion most directly. A tariff thus is second-best
compared to a subsidy. By introducing two distortions rather
than one, trade intervention may succeed in solving one problem,
but only by causing another. In this respect, as this commentator
and Alan Deardorff have remarked, trade policy is like "doing
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acupuncture with a fork: no matter how carefully you insert one
prong, the other is like to do damage."'
Similar examples are rife in the theory of protection. The
classic example is the "infant industry" argument, where a tariff
protects a young industry while it learns to be efficient.6 The
assumption here is that some market failure - such as an
imperfection in the loan market or the impossibility of preventing
new technical knowledge from being copied - makes it impossi-
ble for competitive firms to take advantage of what would
otherwise be a profitable opportunity. A tariff or other import
restriction can therefore make the operation profitable in the
short run while the learning process is underway. Naturally,
though, the success of such a policy depends crucially on a correct
diagnosis of which industries offer the potential for such improve-
ment over time. Political difficulties may also arise in removing
protection once in place.
As in the case of the production externality discussed above,
the infant industry argument may be valid. Some other policy,
however, would be superior. Once again, a production subsidy
equal in size to the tariff yields the same benefits to producers as
the tariff without causing additional costly distortions to consum-
er choice. A better policy would subsidize or guarantee loans to
the industry if the capital market was the real source of the
distortion. A policy permitting firms to appropriate technology
if necessary is another possibility.
Many other arguments for intervention can similarly be traced
to the presumption of a distortion somewhere in the domestic
economy. The need for a correct diagnosis of the distortions at
issue and the realization that they could be better dealt with by
means besides trade policies should be stressed in these cases. Most
international trade economists accept this reasoning, but many
practical policymakers trying to make only marginal improve-
ments in the economic environment reject this argument. As long
as some feasible policy works, they are unlikely to worry that
another policy might work better.
s Alan V. Deardorff and Robert M. Stern, Current Issues in Trade Policy:
An Overview, in U.S. TRADE POLICIES IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY
15, 39 (Robert M. Stern ed., 1987).
6 See INGRAM & DUNN, supra note 1, at 148-51 (discussing the infant
industry argument).
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Thus, some argue that first-best policies are politically
unacceptable and trade interference, though only second best in
economic theory, may be first-best in terms of political reality.
While perhaps true, this is a dangerous argument for several
reasons. First, if trade intervention is politically more acceptable
than domestic taxes and subsidies, it is probably because the
electorate does not understand its true effects. If the public would
not approve of a direct subsidy to an industry, for whatever
reason, then that fact should serve as evidence that protection of
that industry through trade intervention is also socially undesir-
able because of the resulting consumption distortions. Second,
difficulties arise in determining whether the benefits of offsetting
a domestic distortion exceed costs arising from the second
distortion caused by trade intervention. Although precisely
calculating costs and benefits of different policies is very difficult,
substantial empirical evidence nonetheless suggests that the net
effects of trade intervention are detrimental to welfare. A strong
case can thus be made for using first-best policies. A final and
important consideration is that reliance on first-best policies to
correct domestic distortions avoids the potential for conflict
between nations that trade intervention entails.
2.2.3. Trade Intervention in Imperfectly Competitive
Markets
The recognition of imperfect competition in many markets,
both domestic and international, has resulted in recent attention
to analysis of trade and trade policy in an imperfectly competitive
world. The classical case for the gains from trade does not apply
directly in such a world. A very clear understanding of the
alternatives, however, does not yet exist. Instead, there are several
suggestive ideas about the role of trade policy in particular
situations that have not been established with any generality.
The first such idea seems to be the most important. If a
domestic market is not competitive, countries can foster competi-
tion by removing barriers to trade. A major reason that a small
number of producers dominate domestic markets is that these
" Pioneering works in this area include ELHANAN HELPMAN & PAUL
KRUGMAN, MARKET STRUCTURE AND FOREIGN TRADE: INCREASING
RETURNS, IMPERFECT COMPETITION, AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY
(1985) and ELHANAN HELPMAN & PAUL KRUGMAN, TRADE POLICY AND
MARKET STRUCTURE (1989).
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producers are protected from foreign competition by tariffs or
other trade restrictions. If given a choice, producers for the
domestic market will opt for quantitative import restrictions,
since these increase their profit by monopoly pricing in the
domestic market. The trade policy that best improves this
situation does not require any subtle effort to offset the effects of
monopoly power. Instead, a simple opening of markets to free
international trade removes the market power itself and restores
the benefits of competition. A domestic market with only a few
firms may therefore approximate free competition if those firms
must compete with a larger number of foreign producers. The
removal of trade barriers in these circumstances accordingly
removes a source of international conflict and promotes national
and world welfare.
Unfortunately, even worldwide free trade does not assure the
benefits of perfect competition in all markets. Some products are
not as tradeable or readily available as foreign substitutes.
Additionally, the world market itself may be imperfectly competi-
tive, due perhaps to the historical dominance of a few firms or the
nature of the product. Many products in today's international
trade seem to lend themselves more and more to product
differentiation and the use of large-scale and aggressive marketing
techniques. In such cases, while free trade still increases competi-
tion, the imperfect nature of that competition no longer assures
its benefits.
Two issues must be addressed. First, to what extent does the
persistence of imperfect competition, even under free trade,
undermine earlier arguments, particularly the belief that trade
intervention constitutes only a second-best means of dealing with
domestic distortions? Second, do imperfect market structures give
rise to any new arguments for trade intervention?
The first issue cannot be answered definitively since no ingle
model of imperfect competition provides the basis for a conclusive
proof. Nonetheless, it can be established conceptually that the
general principle favoring a domestic policy rather than trade
intervention to remove a distortion continues to hold in cases of
imperfect competition.
As for the second issue, free trade may fail to insure perfect
competition even in traded goods if world markets are not
perfectly competitive. If a firm has a monopoly or if several firms
control world markets, and these firms earn excess profits at the
1996]
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expense of either foreign or domestic consumers, trade interven-
tion may benefit a country that can capture a larger share of these
profits. This idea has considerable appeal. Certainly, if you must
be exploited, it is better politically if domestic residents, not
foreigners, are the exploiters. Even economically there may be a
valid case for trade intervention.
Consider two possible cases. The first involves an effort to
capture a portion of foreign monopoly profits by means of an
import tariff. In this case, the importing country gains from the
tariff only if the price paid to the foreign monopolist falls. The
tariff works here much like the optimum tariff mentioned above
in so far as it improves the importing country's terms of trade.
As before, however, this profit-seeking policy creates conflict and
does not guarantee success if the foreign government retaliates by
taking measures to prevent or offset the shifting of profits abroad.
A second case involves the use of trade intervention to alter
the outcomes of "strategic games" played by imperfectly competi-
tive firms so as to increase the profits to be shared by them with
their sponsoring governments. In effect, the government uses its
policy to precommit firms to behavior that would otherwise
appear to be - and known by their competitors to be - sub-
optimal. It turns out that theoretical models used in generating
such results are rather fragile conceptually, so that changes in key
assumptions negate or reverse the conclusion that profit shifting
is possible. Furthermore, this case for intervention is once again
exploitative and therefore may give rise to retaliation. Thus, if
both governments were to try to play this particular game, both
countries will be worse off. Again, to the extent governments
desisting from exploitative measures recognize this harm, the
scope for international conflict is reduced.
2.2.4. Countervailing and Strategic Intervention
However one may feel about the case for economic theory
about free trade, the fact remains that countries do make extensive
use of policies interfering with trade, perhaps for the reasons
already discussed. This raises the question of whether the cases
for and against intervention differs at all for countries whose
trading partners use such policies.
There are two distinct rationales for responding to other
countries' trade policies. The first reason is to neutralize, offset,
or countervail the presumed adverse effects of a foreign country's
trade policy. The other reason is to strategically discourage the
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use of such policies by foreign countries by threatening or
implementing policies affecting such countries adversely. The two
approaches differ in terms of their goal. In the former case, the
direct benefit of the domestic economy serves as the purpose of
the policy. In the latter case, since the purpose of the policy is to
alter behavior abroad, the policy might be chosen in spite of its
adverse domestic effects. Countervailing intervention makes sense
only if it benefits the domestic economy for its own sake. It is
not enough that it partially undoes the effect of the foreign
country's trade policy to which it responds.
The familiar example of this use of trade policy is the national
and General Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade ("GATT")/World
Trade Organization ("WTO")-sanctioned use of countervailing
duties to offset the effect of foreign export subsidies! This
countervailing policy normally benefits the country using it, but
only to the extent that the importing country is large enough to
improve its terms of trade by imposing the duty. Such a country
could have benefited from a duty even had there been no foreign
subsidy, assuming that it could have avoided retaliation. The
question then is whether the fact of the subsidy, together perhaps
with the official sanctioning of a countervailing duty, reduces the
likelihood of retaliation. Only in this case does it appear that the
use of a countervailing duty is a responsible policy in a competi-
tive environment.
If instead we have an imperfectly competitive world, govern-
ments can use subsidies to give country's producers a competitive
edge in a foreign market. In this case, a countervailing duty of
some sort may be an optimal response on the part of the
importing country's government as it tries to balance the gain
from cheaper subsidized imports against the loss of domestic
firms' monopoly profit. This suggests the more general question
of whether countervailing measures may be justified as a means of
discouraging the use of export subsidies in the first place. Such a
question requires a discussion of strategic intervention.
As mentioned above, a number of arguments suggest that trade
intervention may benefit one country at the expense of others.
' For further discussion of this example, see Michael J. Finger, Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures andAnti-Dumping Agreements, in ORGANIZATION FOR
EcoNOMIc CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE NEW WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM: READINGS 105 (1994).
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Many of these arguments, relating especially to national monopoly
power and use of the optimal tariff, have long been familiar to
international trade economists. But interest in the analysis of
trade under conditions of imperfect competition has expanded the
scope of strategic intervention and led to new interest in the
strategic issues of how countries may use intervention to exploit
others and to keep from being exploited themselves. For the
purposes of this essay, focus should rest on the question of how
policymakers should act in a world of exploitative trade interven-
tion.
In simple terms, the situation poses the classic "prisoners'
dilemma," in which each player has an incentive to act at the
other's expense, and both lose if both act. Although clearly
optimal for them to collectively refrain from acting (intervening
in trade), each has an incentive to depart from that optimum if it
is ever reached. What is interesting, according to analyses by trade
theorists9 and political scientists,'0 is that the greater the perceived
likelihood that a government expects that its trade intervention will
be retaliated against, the closer the solution lies to free trade. This
suggests that although trade intervention itself is harmful for
reasons already discussed, it may nonetheless be desirable that
countries expect intervention by other countries in response to
their own actions.
Alternatively, one could attempt to pursue negotiated solutions
to games such as that above. Such negotiations, however, pose the
well-known problem of enforcing any agreement reached. On the
other hand, incentives to enter into such negotiations are strong,
even if one has no intention of abiding by their outcome.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the trade policy community
has managed to keep such negotiations going during much of the
post-World War II era under the auspices of the GATT."
2.2.5. Trade Intervention for Foreign Policy Reasons
The strategic uses of trade intervention just discussed focused
' See Marie Thursby & Richard Jensen, A Conjectural Variation Approach
to Strategic Tariff Equilibria, 14 J. INT'L ECON. 145-61 (1983).
10 See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
" For a comprehensive analysis of the results of the Uruguay Round, the
eighth round of GATT multilateral negotiations which concluded in 1994, see
WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPERS: THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE
DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (Will Martin & L. Alan Winters eds., 1996).
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specifically on influencing analogous policies abroad. The use of
trade intervention may also carry over to foreign policies having
nothing to do with trade. Since countries depend on and gain
from trade, policies interfering with trade can serve as weapons
and can be used for a variety of aims. Still, one must ask whether
trade intervention can succeed in changing foreign country
policies and, if so, whether it is worth the cost.
To take the second issue first, trade as a political weapon
makes sense only if it is capable of inflicting more harm abroad
than any disruption it causes at home. This clearly would not be
the case for a small country, but for a large country such as the
United States, it seems likely that we could do rather severe
damage to some of our smaller trading partners at relatively little
obvious cost to ourselves. One must be very careful here,
however, especially because markets often work far better than
anyone expects. Even the United States might find that long-run
effects of its policies may be counterproductive in ways difficult
to predict. When foreign markets and foreign suppliers are lost,
either because the United States accidentally hurts them more
than intended or because they look elsewhere for a more certain
trading environment, the United States' claim that it only
manipulated trade to promote the general welfare falls on deaf
ears.
There is also reason to doubt the effectiveness of even more
draconian trade policies, such as embargoes, in changing the
behavior of foreign governments and their constituencies. Trade
can have powerful effects. When used as a weapon, these policies
seem more likely to generate resistance, rather than fear, in the
hearts of its victims. The world's considerable experience with
the use of embargoes indicates a lack of success in drawing
concessions from those they were intended to influence. On the
other hand, trade policy might be more successful in influencing
policies abroad if it is oriented toward providing positive, rather
than negative, incentives in the political sphere. This is certainly
worth exploring further.
2.3. International Factor Movements
The theory of comparative advantage and the gains from trade
assumes that factors of production move without cost between
industries within countries, but not internationally. While this
assumption helps to clarify the role of trade and its impact on the
1996]
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returns to factors of production, it is unrealistic in view of the
often substantial movements of labor and capital from one
country to another that actually occur.
For our present purpose, it is movements of real capital rather
than financial capital that is important. Such movement of real
capital constitutes foreign direct investment (FDI) by international
firms. There is a large body of theory of the determinants of
FDI, but its main motivation derives from the apparent profitabil-
ity involved when the parent company internally controls the
operations of foreign affiliates. FDI results in significant gains in
economic efficiency and consumer welfare in both investing and
host countries. In some circumstances, however, there may be
costs as well. Conflicts may emerge as governments seek to
regulate the investment activities of international firms. In host
countries, for example, the belief that foreign firms can charge
monopoly prices and thus earn excessive profits that they then
transfer abroad may cause disputes. There may be complaints
about the lack of adequate opportunity for indigenous workers to
acquire skills and training, and the inability of the host country
to acquire and independently develop foreign technologies. The
host country may believe, furthermore, that foreign firms
undermine the efficacy of host country economic policies and
maybe even threaten their political sovereignty. As for investing
countries, they may have their own concerns about the loss of
jobs and technological benefits, including spillover effects, as
operations move abroad. Strategic and national defense consider-
ations may also be important.
Population movements between countries have occurred for
centuries for both economic and political reasons. Varying
degrees of control and restriction regulate these movements,
depending upon historical circumstances and countries involved.
Generally, host countries maintain the right to limit immigration,
whereas countries attempting to constrain emigration especially
for political reasons may face international criticism. Just as in
the case of FDI, the international movement of labor may benefit
both the sending and receiving countries by increasing economic
efficiency and welfare. Such movements also create costs as well.
The sending country may suffer as its stock of human capital falls,
particularly since those who leave may be among the most-skilled
and highly-productive workers. Offsetting effects here include
somewhat higher wages for those remaining and the receipt of
remittances from those who moved abroad. In the receiving
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country, immigration may displace domestic workers and result
in lower wages. The immigrants' use of the available social
infrastructure may add further social costs as well.
FDI and the international movement of labor may provide the
basis for conflict between nations, apart from conflicts arising as
countries attempt to deal with the various departures from the
free trade optimum that have been discussed above. The interna-
tional community has not developed mechanisms and institutions
for dealing with problems posed by FDI and the international
movement of workers. Policies here remain the province of
individual nations.
2.4. Departures from Full Employment/External Balance
The standard model of comparative advantage and the gains
from trade assumes the continuous employment of all factors of
production, given perfect competitiveness and smooth functioning
of the markets for goods, services, and factors. Domestic distor-
tions arising from difficulties in adjustment especially in the short-
or medium-run, and market imperfections acting as a barrier to
entry and exit of factors in particular sectors, explain any
unemployment of factors. As discussed, the first-best policy
dealing with distortions is a domestic tax/subsidy directed at the
source of the distortion. Trade policy is generally second-best, or
even worse than second-best, because of the production and
consumption costs involved.
This same conclusion applies at the macroeconomic level.
Departures from full employment may occur for a variety of
reasons. For example, there may be exogenous real shocks due to
an unexpected increase in oil prices or another type of supply
disruption. It is also possible that there are unemployment or
inflationary pressures because of cyclical fluctuations in economic
activity. Such fluctuations may originate domestically or be
transmitted from other countries via induced changes in imports,
exports, and international capital movements. Finally, changes in
monetary and/or fiscal policies may in themselves constitute a
disturbance affecting aggregate employment and involving
international transmission effects working through changes in
foreign trade and capital flows.
Such disturbances can profoundly affect aggregate employment,
prices, the balance of payments, and exchange rates. Accordingly,
these disturbances may give rise to conflicting situations interna-
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tionally as countries seek to offset the domestic consequences of
the disturbances or to shield themselves from the adverse
transmission of foreign influences. Trade intervention seems a
suboptimal way of dealing with these macroeconomic disturbances
when the underlying problems stem from difficulties of adjust-
ment in the markets for goods and services, labor, and foreign
exchange.
International macroeconomic issues and problems have been
analyzed at length over the years. To relate these issues and
problems to the subject of this essay, it may be helpful to
distinguish between the defensive and offensive uses of policies in
coping with various types of macroeconomic disturbances and
interactions. An example of an offensive policy is the imposition
of import restrictions to raise a country's employment level and
improve its current account balance, as it represents an effort by
one country to improve its position at the expense of another. A
currency devaluation designed for the same purpose works
similarly since it improves conditions in the home country while
simultaneously worsening conditions abroad. Policies designed to
improve a country's macroeconomic performance through changes
in exports and imports thus appear to be exploitative. To the
extent that other countries may respond in kind, such policies also
reduce output and employment at home and abroad. By the same
line of reasoning, defensive uses of macroeconomic policies seem
justified if a country wishes to shield itself from the effects of
foreign-induced changes in international trade and capital move-
ments.
The foregoing theoretical reasoning reveals a very interesting
and important lesson of macroeconomic policy, similar to this
essay's point concerning first-best policies. The difference here
arises from the international transmission effects noted. Thus,
suppose two countries both experience a recession or inflation. In
either case, the optimal policy for each country is to undertake
domestic expansionary or contractionary macroeconomic policies
designed to deal with the unemployment or inflationary pressures.
If one country uses trade or exchange rate policies, this constitutes
an exploitative measure since it exaggerates the other country's
problems.
One can also imagine situations in which one country may
experience a recession and another country experiences inflation-
ary pressure. Depending on the type of exchange rate system in
effect, this may or may not result in a conflict situation. With
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fixed exchange rates a conflict arises since expansionary domestic
policies in the recessionary country worsen the country's current
account balance and have opposite effects abroad. A conflict
situation also results if conversely the country with inflation
implements contractionary domestic policies. This problem does
not arise, at least in theory, if the exchange rate is flexible since
the exchange rate movement should help to stabilize each
economy.
In any event, there might be conditions when nations obtain
international harmony by introducing macroeconomic policies
targeted at domestic objectives. International disharmony may
ensue, however, if countries use trade or exchange rate measures
for dealing with domestic problems or introduce incorrect
domestic macroeconomic policies working in a destabilizing
manner internationally. In these instances, countries may desire
to attempt to cooperate by coordinating their policy actions rather
than going it alone.
3. CONCLUSION
This paper has made an effort to demonstrate how the theory
of international trade and international macroeconomics conceptu-
ally handles issues of conflict in international economic rela-
tions.12 In an earlier paper,13 I sought to illustrate how some
particular issues could be analyzed in a pragmatic manner using
the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade. The
Michigan Model is a large-scale computer simulation model of the
major trading countries in the global trading system. The model
has been used to analyze cases of implementing tariffs and
safeguards policies, focusing on how unilateral U.S. actions would
affect other countries. Concerning the imposition of tariffs, the
model indicated that the possibility of retaliation precludes taking
the policy action in the first place. With respect to safeguard
policies designed to deal with unanticipated import surges, a
1 For an analysis in support of many of the points made in this essay and
criticism of the idea that international trade can be viewed as warfare between
nations, see Paul Krugman, The Illusion of Conflict in International Trade, in 2
PEACE ECON., PEACE SCI., AND PUB. PoL'Y 9, 9-18 (1995).
13 Robert M. Stern, Conflict and Cooperation in International Economic
Relations, in BEHAVIOR, CULTURE, AND CONFLICT IN WORLD POLITICS 131
(Harold K. Jacobson and William Zimmerman eds., 1994).
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multilateral-domestic production subsidy, rather than a unilater-
al/multilateral import tariff or quota, seems the preferred policy.
Negotiating options in the Uruguay Round were also analyzed
to show how countries might choose to formulate their negotiat-
ing positions and identify tradeoffs on particular options in the
light of their national interests. The emphasis was on the
employment effects of different options, and the setting was one
of cooperation for mutual gain by means of trade liberalization
under the authority and influence of the GATT. A fourth set of
experiments using the model related to the effects of unilater-
al/multilateral embargoes of international trade in armaments on
employment in the major Western countries. According to
experiments, the United States would experience only compara-
tively minor employment shifts with the elimination of trade in
armaments. Other countries might experience more disruption of
employment, but phasing in policy changes could mitigate the
effects. In this last case, officials at the highest political levels
would have to agree in order to effect the reductions in arma-
ments trade. In reaching such a decision, it would be important
to know how disruptive such changes would be. The Michigan
Model results suggest that the effects involved would be manage-
able. If the countries concerned accept this conclusion, then
cooperative steps could be taken to defuse the potential for
conflict arising as the result of international trade in armaments.
The Michigan Model is only one example of the contribution
that international economists can make to the analysis of conflict
and cooperation in the international economic system. One can
point to other economic modeling efforts dealing with different
aspects of the global trading and payments system. The insights
from international trade and macroeconomic theory and empirical
economic modeling thus have much to offer to economic and
legal analysts and government officials involved in the internation-
al policy process.
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